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1 
REWRITING OUR NATION’S DEADLY TRAFFIC MANUAL 
Sara C. Bronin∗ & Gregory H. Shill∗∗ 
Every day, Americans entrust their lives to a road system that is governed by the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (the Manual).  On its face, 
this Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) publication is a straightforward technical 
document.  It contains over eight hundred pages of engineering guidance on everything 
from traffic-light placement to the font of highway signs.  It also establishes acceptable 
methods for officials to modify speed limits. 
While such provisions may sound inconsequential, some of the Manual’s provisions have 
far-reaching, even deadly, consequences.  They prioritize vehicular speed over public safety, 
mobility over other uses of public space, and driving over other modes of mobility.  With 
these car-centric priorities, the Manual has helped generate a nearly constant and fast-
moving stream of vehicle traffic that renders road users like pedestrians, wheelchair users, 
and cyclists vulnerable.  Moreover, by giving preference to driving over other modes of 
transportation, the Manual has indirectly facilitated a rise in transportation-related 
greenhouse gas emissions that are the single largest contributor to climate change. 
Despite the evidence stacked against some of its most important provisions, the Manual 
has stubbornly endured — perhaps because it has been virtually unknown outside of 
transportation engineering and urban planning.  But over the past year, the Manual has 
finally started to receive the scrutiny it deserves.  In 2020, the FHWA proposed a new 
draft of the Manual that would maintain the current version’s most outdated and 
discredited features.  During a recently closed notice-and-comment process, the agency 
received over 26,500 comments.  Even in the unlikely event that the agency rips up the 
proposed revisions and starts fresh, the core of the Manual will probably remain intact for 
years to come. 
This Essay explains how the Manual biases transportation behavior in dangerous and 
inequitable ways.  It urges the FHWA to use its emergency powers to rescind its most 
damaging provision — the so-called 85th Percentile Rule, which legalizes dangerously 
high speeds of traffic — and to undertake a complete rewrite that follows a scientifically 
sound, evidence-based approach; prioritizes safety, access, equity, climate action, and 
prosperity; and incorporates feedback from diverse stakeholders. 
INTRODUCTION 
By a combination of toxic emissions and crashes, cars kill nearly 
100,000 Americans every year.1  This toll is equal to one and a half times 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 See Fabio Caiazzo et al., Air Pollution and Early Deaths in the United States. Part I:  
Quantifying the Impact of Major Sectors in 2005, 79 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 198, 207 (2013) (find-
ing 58,300 premature deaths annually in the United States attributable to auto pollution, with an 
estimated average loss of twelve life-years per mortality); Nat’l Safety Council, Car Crash Deaths 
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the number of gun homicides and opioid overdoses combined,2 and is 
one reason for the lower life expectancy enjoyed by Americans (even 
wealthy Americans) compared with residents of peer countries.3  U.S. 
policy has historically favored driving over all other modes of transpor-
tation.4  The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (the  
Manual), the subject of this Essay, is one of several key legal influences 
on transportation behavior.5 
First published in 1935, the Manual has been administered by the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) since 1971 and is in its tenth 
edition.6  Its influence is felt not only on federal highways but on nearly 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and Rates, INJURY FACTS, https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/motor-vehicle/historical-fatality-
trends/deaths-and-rates [https://perma.cc/3D49-NYAM] (reporting U.S. motor vehicle deaths as 
ranging from 37,757 to 40,327 per year for 2015–19, the five most recent years for which full data 
are available); see also Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/84VR-
L677] (documenting that “[t]he transportation sector generates the largest share of greenhouse gas emis-
sions” in the United States). 
 2 See Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www. 
drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/AAH8-9AV5] 
(reporting 49,860 U.S. overdose deaths involving any opioid in 2019, the most recent year available); 
Assault or Homicide, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm [https://perma.cc/R9SD-FKF9]  (reporting 14,414 
U.S. firearm homicides in 2018, the most recent year available). 
 3 See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Why Americans Die So Much, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2021), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/09/america-life-expectancy-spans-death-eu-
rope/620028 [https://perma.cc/Q6H2-YAE8]. 
 4 See Sara C. Bronin, Rules of the Road: The Struggle for Safety and the Unmet Promise of 
Federalism, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2153, 2164–73 (2021); Gregory H. Shill, The Future of Law and 
Transportation, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2107, 2109–14 (2021); Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize 
Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 502–04 (2020).  
 5 The Manual, known to traffic engineers as the MUTCD, is not the only document governing 
road design.  The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials’ “Green 
Book” dictates road and lane width and intersection design, among other things.  See generally AM. 
ASS’N OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFS., A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC DESIGN OF 
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS (7th ed. 2018).  The National Association of City Transportation  
Officials’ guides, in particular the Urban Street Design Guide, supply additional optional resources 
for street design.  See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFS., URBAN STREET DESIGN 
GUIDE, at viii (2013).  Fire codes also impact road geometries.  See, e.g., INT’L FIRE CODE app. 
D (Int’l Code Council 2020), https://codes.iccsafe.org/content/IFC2021P1/appendix-d-fire-
apparatus-access-roads [https://perma.cc/BQT2-4NRQ] (providing a model code for road geome-
tries that accommodate fire engines).  Traffic-engineering culture and local government political 
dynamics also play important roles.  See generally CHARLES L. MAROHN, JR., CONFESSIONS OF 
A RECOVERING ENGINEER: TRANSPORTATION FOR A STRONG TOWN (2021) (discussing the 
role of traffic engineering culture in complicating reform); JANETTE SADIK-KHAN & SETH 
SOLOMONOW, STREETFIGHT: HANDBOOK FOR AN URBAN REVOLUTION (2017) (discussing 
local government constraints in the context of transportation reform). 
 6 See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC 
CONTROL DEVICES FOR STREETS AND HIGHWAYS I-2 tbl.I-1 (2009), 
https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009r1r2/mutcd2009r1r2edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/P37D-UN34] 
[hereinafter MANUAL] (explaining the evolution of the ten versions of the Manual and identifying 
two previous manuals, not called the MUTCD, in 1927 and 1930). 
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every neighborhood block in America because it is adopted (and 
adapted, in often very minor ways) into state and local laws governing 
road design.7  On its face, the Manual is a straightforward technical 
document.  It contains over eight hundred pages of engineering guidance 
on everything from traffic-light placement8 to the font of highway 
signs.9  It also prescribes acceptable methods for modifying speed lim-
its.10  While such provisions may sound benign, some of them have life-
or-death consequences. 
After spending decades in relative obscurity, the Manual has re-
ceived a flood of scrutiny over the past year.  In 2020, the FHWA an-
nounced a proposed revision to the Manual (“Proposed Manual”).11  
Over 26,500 public comments were submitted,12 including one from 
us.13  We argued that the Proposed Manual would perpetuate some 
longstanding arbitrary, capricious, or discredited rules, even as it intro-
duced new ones bearing the same defects.14  On the whole, the Proposed 
Manual would carry over to the twenty-first century some of the direst 
transportation policy failures of the twentieth.  Moreover, it would make 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(a) (2020) (“The MUTCD approved by the Federal Highway  
Administrator is the national standard for all traffic control devices installed on any street, highway, 
or bicycle trail open to public travel . . . .”); id. § 655.603(b)(1) (“Where State or other Federal agency 
MUTCDs or supplements are required, they shall be in substantial conformance with the National 
MUTCD.”); Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD): Overview, FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/kno-overview.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KW9G-WNH6] (describing the Manual’s status as “the law governing all traffic 
control devices” and noting that noncompliance “ultimately can result in the loss of federal-aid 
funds as well as in a significant increase in tort liability”); Speed Limit Basics, FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speed-
mgt/ref_mats/fhwasa16076/fhwasa16076.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2HM-QWVK] (“State and local 
transportation agencies recommend and set appropriate speed limits by completing engineering 
speed studies and following the guidance presented in the MUTCD.”); Who Uses the MUTCD? And 
How?, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
kno-users.htm [https://perma.cc/S34J-MYB9] (“When a new edition or revision of the national 
MUTCD is issued, States have two years to adopt it, with or without a State supplement, or to 
adopt a State MUTCD that is in substantial conformance with the new edition of the National 
MUTCD.”).  
 8 MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 4D.13-.16.   
 9 Id. §§ 2A.13, 2D.05. 
 10 Id. § 2B.13. 
 11 Fed. Highway Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Corrected MUTCD Proposed Text (Dec. 18, 
2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document/FHWA-2020-0001-0038 [https://perma.cc/R6FZ-
3467] [hereinafter Proposed Manual]. 
 12 See National Standards for Traffic Control Devices; the Manual on Uniform Traffic  
Control Devices for Streets and Highways; Revision, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FHWA-2020-0001 [https://perma.cc/KQ5X-
DA2R] (indicating 26,522 comments received on the proposed amendments to the Manual).   
 13 Sara C. Bronin & Gregory H. Shill, Public Comment on Proposed Revisions to the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (May 14, 2020), https://www. 
regulations.gov/comment/FHWA-2020-0001-15601 [https://perma.cc/KZP8-3GZ9]. 
 14 Id. at 2. 
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it nearly impossible to accomplish our nation’s official goal of “zero 
deaths” on the roads.15 
This Essay reveals how the Proposed Manual would intensify the 
social costs of the current Manual and sets forth key principles of an 
alternative vision.  In Part I, we explain the original sin of the Manual: 
it biases transportation behavior in dangerous and inequitable ways, 
prioritizing the speed of cars and the convenience of drivers over other 
modes and users.  The Proposed Manual continues this “throughput 
ethos,” the consequences of which we explore in Part II.  Part III sug-
gests changes in response.  In section III.A, we urge the FHWA to use 
its emergency powers to eliminate the most damaging provision, the 
85th Percentile Rule for modifying speed limits — if not completely, then 
at least in urban and suburban settings.  In section III.B, we call on the 
FHWA to withdraw a radical new chapter in the Proposed Manual, 
which would make public safety and welfare contingent on the success 
of unproven automated vehicles.  Finally, in section III.C, we suggest 
reviewing the remainder of the Manual through the lens of three guiding 
principles: fostering fairness for all types of road users; incorporating 
diverse expert and community opinions; and facilitating local flexibility 
and innovation, especially in cities and communities that are dispropor-
tionately harmed by fast vehicular traffic.  Where specific provisions 
hinder achievement of these goals, the Manual should be rewritten. 
Overall, we hope these measures can ensure that the next version of 
the Manual will be grounded in evidence and prioritize safety, access, 
equity, and climate action. 
I.  THE “THROUGHPUT” ETHOS OF THE MANUAL 
Under FHWA policy, maximizing “throughput” — or the number of 
vehicles able to pass through a given marker, such as an intersection, in 
a given period — is a key measure of effectiveness.16  The Manual em-
bodies this fast-driving ethos.  It establishes a hierarchy of vehicular 
speed over public safety, vehicular mobility over other uses of public 
space, and driving over other modes of mobility.  The Proposed Manual 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 Zero Deaths – Saving Lives Through a Safety Culture and a Safe System, FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/zerodeaths/zero_deaths_vision.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/A92U-MNET]. 
 16 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC ANALYSIS TOOLBOX 
VOLUME VI: DEFINITION, INTERPRETATION, AND CALCULATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 
TOOLS MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS § 6.1, at 106–07 (2007), https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
publications/fhwahop08054/fhwahop08054.pdf [https://perma.cc/26ZJ-5TP6].  The FHWA defini-
tion acknowledges the possibility that a policymaker might seek to move people rather than vehi-
cles, but the rest of the definition and guidance refers only to maximizing throughput, minimizing 
delays and travel time, and limiting traffic congestion.  See id. 
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is no different.  Like other versions of the Manual, it states that its pur-
pose “is to establish national criteria for the use of traffic control devices 
that meet the needs and expectancy of road users on all streets, high-
ways, bikeways, and site roadways open to public travel.”17  But the 
pages that follow interpret “road users” to be primarily drivers of auto-
mobiles. 
One glaring example of bias in the current and Proposed Manuals 
alike is the “85th Percentile Rule,” a method that empowers traffic offi-
cials to adjust the speed limit to the speed at or below which 85% of 
vehicles are traveling “in free-flowing traffic.”18  If as few as 15% of 
drivers are driving faster than the current posted limit, for example in 
light traffic, then this method would counsel raising the speed limit to 
legalize the conduct of that minority, even if doing so would be reckless.  
The 85th Percentile Rule does not merely favor driving over other forms 
of mobility; it delegates the interpretation of the law to the subset of 
drivers who are violating it most aggressively.  Worse, as detailed more 
fully in section III.A, it erases the interests of anyone who is not driving. 
Beyond the speed limit, road-design standards also establish a max-
imum-throughput vision in the Manual.  For example, the Proposed 
Manual leaves in place current guidance that “[c]rosswalk markings 
should not be used indiscriminately” and that an engineering study must 
be done before a crosswalk is installed.19  Such study requirements en-
trench the status quo by raising the cost of installing new crosswalks.  
Similarly, the Manual sets forth an array of factors to be taken into ac-
count by an engineer to determine when a new traffic signal or cross-
walk is warranted.20  One factor is pedestrian activity.  Justifying a mid-
block crosswalk signal on a major street, for example, requires the 
observation of at least 107 pedestrians crossing the street per hour.21  
Neither the Manual nor the Proposed Manual establishes a maximum 
block length, and “blocks” (distances between intersections) in suburban 
and rural areas can stretch for a half mile or more.22  By making it 
difficult to install a crosswalk, the Manual creates sewers of constant, 
fast traffic that impede walkability and safety. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 1A.01. 
 18 MANUAL, supra note 6, § 2B.13.12; see also Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 2B.21.  The 
rule is also sometimes referred to as the Operating Speed Method or 85th Percentile Speed.  See, 
e.g., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., METHODS AND PRACTICES FOR 
SETTING SPEED LIMITS 12 (2012), https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speed-
mgt/ref_mats/fhwasa12004/fhwasa12004.pdf  [https://perma.cc/8PTZ-MP2W]. 
 19 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 3C.02. 
 20 See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 4C.01–.10 (listing various “warrants,” or factors that 
must be established to justify the installation of a traffic-control signal). 
 21 Id. § 4C.05 & fig.4C-5. 
 22 See, e.g., PATRICK M. CONDON, SEVEN RULES FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES 48–
49 (2010).  
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An alternative method of justifying a crosswalk is to require a certain 
amount of human and material sacrifice.  Five or more serious 
crashes — crashes that exceed the reporting threshold for injury, death, 
and/or property damage — within a twelve-month period are necessary, 
though not sufficient, to add a crosswalk under this “Crash Experience” 
warrant.23  Since they lack the protection of an automobile, pedestrians 
bear the brunt of the burden of this minimum-crash requirement.  It is 
aggravated by other rules about striping and signalization that put pe-
destrians and bikers in dangerous situations,24 where they are less visi-
ble to cars, less protected from cars, or not accounted for at all. 
The Proposed Manual charts new terrain for throughput by adding 
an entire new chapter on automated vehicles.25  As detailed in section 
III.B, this technology is too experimental, too unsafe, and too likely to 
produce racially disparate outcomes to mandate that our roads be re-
built around it.  The fact that the Proposed Manual drafters have in-
cluded an entire chapter on automated vehicles underscores the drafters’ 
car-centric bias. 
These examples all illustrate how the Manual and Proposed Manual 
promote fast vehicle travel, trading off important social priorities, such 
as community vitality, safe access for pedestrians, and clean air, in the 
service of throughput.  These other goals do not appear to be a priority 
of the principal group that advises the FHWA on the Manual, the  
National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices; in section 
III.C, we address this gap by offering ideas for enhancing the quality 
and diversity of participation in that process. 
II.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE THROUGHPUT ETHOS 
The maximum-throughput approach embodied by the Manual has 
had many consequences.  It makes driving faster and other modes of 
travel slower and more dangerous, raising the level and risks of driving.  
One group that benefits little from this approach is nondrivers.  Almost 
100 million Americans — about one in three — lack a driver’s license 
and thus are legally unable to drive at all.26  Tens of millions of these 
people are old enough, but have disabilities, cost constraints, or other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4C.08. 
 24 See, e.g., id. § 4E.03. 
 25 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, §§ 5A.01–5B.06. 
 26 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., HIGHWAY STATISTICS 2019, at tbl.DV-1C (2019), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2019/dv1c.cfm [https://perma.cc/V36Y-
X93M] (showing that, in 2019, the total U.S. population was 328 million, and the number of drivers 
was 229 million). 
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barriers to licensure.27  These Americans are by and large excluded from 
the benefits of the Manual’s emphasis on throughput. 
One need look no further than the past year and a half for evidence 
of the direct danger of car-centric policy.  Although driving dropped off 
sharply during the worst of the pandemic, 2020 saw the highest year-
over-year increase in roadway death rates on a per-mile-traveled basis 
in ninety-six years.28  One widely acknowledged reason for this spike is 
that the lighter traffic allowed uninhibited, faster driving, a develop-
ment for which the Manual helped lay the groundwork prior to the pan-
demic.29  This phenomenon represents a Monkey’s Paw30 fulfillment of 
a longstanding wish of highway engineers: amid pandemic shutdowns, 
the Manual’s principal goal of increased traffic flow and decreased con-
gestion was finally achieved, but proved to be deadly. 
The Manual’s emphasis on maximum throughput comes with indi-
rect consequences as well.  By helping to ensure driving is preferable to 
other modes of transportation, the Manual has facilitated a rise in green-
house gas emissions.  In the United States, the transportation sector is 
now the number-one source of greenhouse gases,31 and within that sec-
tor the private automobile share of emissions predominates.32  The non-
climate impact of emissions is substantial as well, and cannot be eradi-
cated through electric vehicles alone.  Over 90% of deadly, cancer-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See, e.g., Lack of Transportation Options Worry Seniors, People with Disabilities, METRO 
MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.metro-magazine.com/10031987/lack-of-transportation-options-
worry-seniors-people-with-disabilities [https://perma.cc/2R8D-GJRM]; Alana Semuels, No Driver’s 
License, No Job, THE ATLANTIC (June 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653 [https://perma.cc/5UQ3-DTF2]. 
 28 Motor Vehicle Deaths in 2020 Estimated to Be Highest in 13 Years, Despite Dramatic Drops 
in Miles Driven, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.nsc.org/newsroom/motor-
vehicle-deaths-2020-estimated-to-be-highest [https://perma.cc/C36A-8SFJ].  
 29 See, e.g., Paul Berger & Coulter Jones, New York City Traffic Deaths Rise During Covid-19 
Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city- 
traffic-deaths-rise-during-covid-19-pandemic-11608382800 [https://perma.cc/TB7Z-8FJQ] (attrib-
uting a rise in traffic deaths in the New York area to “reckless behavior on the city’s emptier roads”). 
 30 See W.W. JACOBS, THE MONKEY’S PAW (1902).  In the story, the protagonist is granted 
three wishes, but they come true with an enormous price. 
 31 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 1.  Transportation also emits more carbon 
dioxide (one greenhouse gas) into the air than industrial, residential, or commercial uses.  U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0035(2021/8), AUGUST 2021 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 
fig.11.2, at 198 (2021), https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TST5-FR7J]. 
 32 Passenger cars contribute 41% of the greenhouse gases submitted by the transportation sector, 
while light-duty trucks (sport utility vehicles, pickup trucks, and minivans) contribute 17%.  U.S. 
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-21-005, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990–2019, at ES-13 (2021), https://www.epa.gov/sites/produc-
tion/files/2021-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2021-main-text.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWM6-DMDU].  
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causing particulate matter generated by cars in traffic comes from non-
exhaust emissions, for example, such as tire- and brake-pad wear.33   
Social policy must target a reduction in the levels and risks of driving, 
especially to people outside the car. 
As has been documented extensively, the lives taken by car crashes 
are far likelier to be African American, Latino, Indigenous, low income, 
or belong to people with disabilities than the general population.34  Even 
after adjusting for differences in walking rates, African American pe-
destrians face two-thirds more danger than their white counterparts and 
Native American pedestrians twice as much.35  Transportation-related 
emissions disproportionately affect the health of those same groups.36  
Indeed, significant parts of the road system have been built in ways that 
have destroyed low-income communities and communities of people of 
color.37  The choice to accommodate the rise of the automobile by dis-
placing Black, immigrant, and poor Americans for roadbuilding super-
charged racial segregation and health disparities that continue to this 
day.38  In the words of U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg, 
“[t]here is racism physically built into some of our highways.”39 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 See Victor R.J.H. Timmers & Peter A.J. Achten, Non-exhaust PM Emissions from Electric 
Vehicles, 134 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 10, 14 (2016). 
 34 See, e.g., SMART GROWTH AM. & NAT’L COMPLETE STS. COAL., DANGEROUS BY 
DESIGN 26–28 (2021), https://smartgrowthamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Dangerous-
By-Design-2021-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z42J-Q2ZH].  Moreover, car crashes are a leading 
cause of death for children.  See U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 10 
LEADING CAUSES OF INJURY DEATHS BY AGE GROUP HIGHLIGHTING UNINTENTIONAL 
INJURY DEATHS, UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-charts/ 
leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_unintentional_2018_1100w850h.jpg [https://perma.cc/ 
ZXU6-6Z44]. 
 35 SMART GROWTH AM. & NAT’L COMPLETE STS. COAL., supra note 34, at 27 (reporting 
Pedestrian Danger Index scores of 53.5 for non-Hispanic white pedestrians, 55.1 for  
Hispanic/Latinx, 89.6 for Black or African American, and 111.5 for American Indian or Alaska 
Native); see also id. at 31 (appendix explaining the methodology behind the Pedestrian Danger 
Index and other calculations). 
 36 MARIA CECILIA PINTO DE MOURA & DAVID REICHMUTH, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, INEQUITABLE EXPOSURE TO AIR POLLUTION FROM VEHICLES IN THE 
NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC 1–2 (2019), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/inequitable- 
exposure-air-pollution-vehicles [https://perma.cc/TJ3V-7KHW]; Disparities in the Impact of Air 
Pollution, AM. LUNG ASS’N (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-
risk/disparities [https://perma.cc/Y7SV-Y8KU].  
 37 See Deborah N. Archer, “White Men’s Roads Through Black Men’s Homes”: Advancing Racial 
Equity Through Highway Deconstruction, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264–65 (2020).  
 38 See, e.g., Kevin M. Kruse, What Does a Traffic Jam in Atlanta Have to Do with Segregation? 
Quite a Lot., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/traffic-atlanta-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/5SVK-FEV9] 
(“While Interstates were regularly used to destroy black neighborhoods, they were also used to keep 
black and white neighborhoods apart.  Today, major roads and highways serve as stark dividing 
lines between black and white sections [in a variety of cities.]”). 
 39 Corinne Grinapol, Biden Administration Seeks to Address the Interstate Highway System’s 
Racist Past, ENG’G NEWS-RECORD (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.enr.com/articles/51593-biden- 
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The onerous process prescribed by the Manual and Proposed  
Manual for enhancing pedestrian safety discussed in Part I can also be 
expected to have a disparate impact on vulnerable groups.  For example, 
people of color, people with disabilities, and other socioeconomically dis-
advantaged populations have a higher propensity to walk or use wheel-
chairs for transportation — and are thus more exposed to the risks of 
vehicle traffic, as they lack the protection of vehicles.  The data bear 
this out.40  In addition, there may be some bias in where pedestrian-
safety infrastructure is installed, as disadvantaged populations are un-
derresourced and face higher burdens in transportation infrastructure as 
in other domains. 
III.  REWRITING THE MANUAL 
 We propose several changes to the Manual so that it promotes, or at 
least no longer impedes, the paramount goals of safety, climate action, 
racial justice, and prosperity.  In this Part, we identify and explain three 
areas of urgently needed reform: elimination of the 85th Percentile Rule, 
which undermines safety and the rule of law; withdrawal of a proposal 
to render millions of miles of American streets41 more hostile to 
vulnerable road users in the name of an unproven technology; and the 
application of principles that reflect broader policy goals and are 
informed by all the stakeholders affected by the Manual — especially 
those, like pedestrians in communities of concern, for whom the 
Manual’s rules can mean the difference between life and death. 
A.  Eliminate the 85th Percentile Rule Allowing the  
Deadliest Drivers to Set the Speed Limit 
Between a quarter and a third of all traffic deaths each year are 
speeding related — that is, related to the fact that a driver is exceeding 




 40 See, e.g., Cara Hamann et al., Racial Disparities in Pedestrian-Related Injury  
Hospitalizations in the United States, 20 BMC PUB. HEALTH, no. 1459, 2020, at 1, 6 (“Results 
from this study show that the burden of injury from pedestrian injuries is higher among non-
Whites . . . .”). 
 41 As of 2019 there were 4.1 million miles of public road in the United States, just over 2.9 
million of them paved.  See Bureau of Transp. Stats., Public Road and Street Mileage in the United 
States by Type of Surface, https://www.bts.gov/content/public-road-and-street-mileage-united-
states-type-surfacea [https://perma.cc/VW2R-VCCW]. 
 42 Nat’l Safety Council, Speeding, INJURY FACTS, https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/motor- 
vehicle/motor-vehicle-safety-issues/speeding [https://perma.cc/L2K8-Q3G3] (providing statistics for 
2000–2019). 
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turn human mistakes into tragedies.  This is a grave problem, compara-
ble to the share of road deaths attributable to alcohol-impaired driv-
ing.43  However, left uncounted even in this substantial figure are deaths 
that result from lawful high speeds.  In recent years, nearly three- 
quarters of traffic deaths have not been speeding related.44  Why?   
Because speed limits themselves are dangerously high, a risk the Manual 
helped generate and that the Proposed Manual would sustain.  Using 
the emergency rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act,45 the FHWA should revoke the 85th Percentile Rule. 
Speed limits are established in the first instance by statute.  Once 
established, the Manual empowers traffic officials to raise the limit to 
the speed chosen by the driver traveling at the eighty-fifth percentile 
speed — that is, the driver traveling faster than 85% of other cars.46  
This 85th Percentile Rule thus permits the most reckless 15% of drivers 
to trigger an increase in the speed limit simply by breaking it.  In theory, 
this rule works in the other direction, too, to authorize a reduction in 
the speed limit where traffic speeds are lower.  In practice, it is closer to 
a one-way ratchet, as downward departures from the 85th Percentile 
Rule require more elaborate bureaucratic and engineering justifications, 
even in situations where the roadway hazards and scientific analysis of 
crash data show the street is dangerous.47  The Proposed Manual does 
not merely repeat these prescriptions; it elevates them from an “Option” 
to recommended “Guidance,” giving them a higher priority under the 
Manual’s internal rules.48 
It is intuitive that high speeds flow in part from high speed limits, 
but under the Manual, they also help raise the limits.  Nonmotorists 
bear the brunt of excessive speed risk.  For example, at twenty miles per 
hour, a pedestrian has a 95% chance of surviving a collision with a car, 
but, at forty miles per hour, that chance drops to 15%.49  When a pedes-
trian is killed by a motorist obeying the speed limit, her death is likely 
not recorded as speeding related.  Pedestrian deaths increased 46% from 
the start of the 2010s to the end, nine times the overall rate at which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/SS-17/01 PB2017 – 102341, REDUCING 
SPEEDING-RELATED CRASHES INVOLVING PASSENGER VEHICLES 7 (2017), 
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SS1701.pdf [https://perma.cc/C383-L8QY]. 
 44 Nat’l Safety Council, supra note 42. 
 45 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). 
 46 MANUAL, supra note 6, § 2B.13.12. 
 47 See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 18, at 13. 
 48 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 2B.21. 
 49 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 43, at 11.  These figures predate the increase 
in height and weight of the typical vehicle on American roads, and thus likely understate the risk 
to pedestrians.  See generally ANGIE SCHMITT, RIGHT OF WAY (2020) (examining the causes of 
increased traffic violence in the United States). 
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traffic deaths increased.50  Excessive speeds and speed limits were not 
the only factors51 but they likely played a contributing role. 
The 85th Percentile Rule is not well supported by the research.  In 
2012, the FHWA acknowledged its weak foundation, observing that 
“[t]he original research between speed and safety which purported that 
the safest travel speed is the 85th percentile speed is dated research and 
may not be valid under scrutiny.”52  The FHWA has stated that often 
“the 50th percentile operating speed is either near or exceeds that posted 
speed limit,” so establishing the speed limit at the 85th percentile level 
is almost certain to result in higher speeds.53 
Many other agencies and experts have criticized the 85th Percentile 
Rule’s lack of scientific foundation and propensity to increase crash 
rates.  The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), for example, 
has warned that “[r]aising speed limits to match the 85th percentile 
speed can result in unintended consequences,” including “higher operat-
ing speeds, and thus a higher 85th percentile speed.”54  Further, the 
NTSB has called into question the scientific basis of the method and 
recommended alternative methods, in particular ones that are sensitive 
to crash history and pedestrian danger.55 
Though sanctioned by the Manual, the 85th Percentile Rule is anath-
ema to the rule of law.  Rather than enhancing predictability, stability, 
or fairness in administration, it empowers those who violate the law to 
trigger an opaque administrative process that results in a change in legal 
regime.  The 85th Percentile Rule is perhaps unique in American law in 
empowering lawbreakers to activate a rewrite of the law to legalize their 
own unlawful conduct.  Given that speeding is a leading factor for 
deadly crashes and speed itself is undoubtedly a factor in many more, 
this arbitrary and capricious method has serious real-world  
consequences. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 See Pedestrian Deaths Soar in 2020 Despite Precipitous Drop in Driving During Pandemic, 
GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (May 20, 2021), https://www.ghsa.org/resources/news- 
releases/GHSA/Ped-Spotlight-Addendum21 [https://perma.cc/XQL9-B44M]. 
 51 The increase is multicausal and is the subject of a growing body of research and commentary.  
See, e.g., SCHMITT, supra note 49; Robert J. Schneider et al., United States Fatal Pedestrian Hot 
Spot Locations and Characteristics, 14 J. TRANSP. & LAND USE 1, 14–16 (2021); GOVERNORS 
HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC FATALITIES BY STATE:  
2020 PRELIMINARY DATA (2021), https://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/ 
Ped%20Spotlight%202021%20FINAL%203.23.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2RR-BWS4]. 
 52 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 18, at 12 n.*. 
 53 Id. at 13.  
 54 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/SS-17/01, SAFETY STUDY: REDUCING SPEEDING-
RELATED CRASHES INVOLVING PASSENGER VEHICLES, at x (2017), 
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SS1701.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX3X-
7SAR]. 
 55 See id. (“In general, there is not strong evidence that the 85th percentile speed within a given 
traffic flow equates to the speed with the lowest crash involvement rate for all road types.   
Alternative approaches and expert systems for setting speed limits are available, which incorporate 
factors such as crash history and the presence of vulnerable road users such as pedestrians.”). 
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The 85th Percentile Rule also ignores the safety and well-being of 
most people on or in the area of the public right of way.  In affording 
the lawbreaking minority the power to raise speed limits, it overrides 
the interests of the 85% of motorists who are traveling more slowly 
(many or most of them obeying the law); the interests of passengers who 
do not wish for their risk of injury to increase; the interests of road 
workers and law enforcement, who must contend with the elevated risks 
of raised speed limits without any corresponding benefit; and, most of 
all, the interests of people walking, biking, and using wheelchairs in or 
adjacent to the right of way, whose interests are definitionally excluded 
by the 85th Percentile Rule. 
Given that the 85th Percentile Rule is already present in the Manual, 
merely scrapping the Proposed Manual is not sufficient.  The FHWA 
should eliminate the 85th Percentile Rule and make clear that govern-
ment agencies that rely on it are not acting in conformance with the 
Manual. 
B.  Withdraw the Proposed Chapter Concerning  
Automated Vehicles 
“Science promises a future free of traffic accidents. 
 
THE ELECTRIC HIGHWAY.  Cars using this expressway ‘hook-
in’ to an electronic beam, which controls speeds, prevents accidents. 
 
THE JAM-PROOF EXPRESSWAY.  Through-city free-
ways . . . speed cars to their destinations, ending traffic jams. 
 
THE AIR CAR.  A car without wheels rides on a cushion of air, 
achieving great speeds with unexcelled safety features.” 
 
The above slogans appear in an advertisement placed by officials for 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including O.D. “Mike” Shipley, 
State Commissioner of Traffic Safety.56  The year: 1961.57 
The Proposed Manual includes a new chapter, Part 5, concerning 
automated vehicles (the Chapter).  Despite being written sixty years af-
ter the promise of a “jam-proof expressway,” this Chapter remains prem-
ature to the extent that it is intended to provide for fully-automated (or 
autonomous) vehicles (AVs).  It also expresses an outdated, narrow view 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 See Science Promises a Future Free of Traffic Accidents, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 30, 
1961, at 107. 
 57 See id.  This ad was issued by the Governor’s Highway Safety Program of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania and appeared in multiple newspapers.  Id.  The authors thank Peter Norton, who 
unearthed this advertisement, for making it available for our research. 
  
2021] OUR NATION’S DEADLY TRAFFIC MANUAL 13 
 
of transportation policy objectives.  For these reasons, it should be 
stricken from the Proposed Manual. 
In anticipation of the arrival of AVs, the Chapter seeks to maximize 
uniformity over and above important alternative goals.  For example, 
the Chapter warns against streets with decorative crosswalks.58  Many 
legal crosswalks are not marked at all;59 the Chapter fails to address 
how AVs should interact with them, nor does it advise road engineers to 
mark crosswalks in preparation for AVs. 
Other provisions of the Chapter prescribe affirmative changes that 
are harmful.  One section encourages wider roads,60 which have been 
shown to promote faster and more dangerous driving.61  With regard to 
bicycle facilities (a topic that receives a treatment two sentences in 
length), the Chapter suggests separated bike lanes protected by “physical 
barriers where practicable.”62  It is silent as to what should happen when 
such safety measures are deemed not “practicable” — a subjective con-
cept that is sure to be influenced by the twin constraints of throughput 
and the technological limitations of AVs.  Intersections are already one 
place where physical barriers between bicycle and vehicular traffic are 
impossible and where traffic engineers have a propensity to “give up”;63 
the Chapter’s failure to specify the priority of safety in the determination 
of practicability may encourage more areas to be seen in the same way. 
Automated vehicles have been in development since before World 
War II.64  With a prototype of the automatic transmission having been 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 5B.02.I. 
 59 See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., HRT-04-100, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., SAFETY EFFECTS 
OF MARKED VERSUS UNMARKED CROSSWALKS AT UNCONTROLLED LOCATIONS 2 (2005), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/04100/04100.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KXC-
ARL4] (“[A] crosswalk at an intersection is defined as the extension of the sidewalk or the shoulder 
across the intersection, regardless of whether it is marked or not.”); see also NAT’L COMM. ON 
UNIF. TRAFFIC L. & ORDINANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE AND MODEL TRAFFIC 
ORDINANCE § 1-118(a) (2000) (including in the definition of a legal “crosswalk” intersections that 
meet certain common criteria). 
 60 See Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 5B.02.B (suggesting continuous edge markings of six 
inches on each side of roads with speed limits of less than forty miles per hour). 
 61 See Subha Ranjan Banerjee & Ben Welle, Bigger Isn’t Always Better: Narrow Traffic Lanes 
Make Cities Safer, THECITYFIX (Dec. 6, 2016), https://thecityfix.com/blog/bigger-isnt-always- 
better-narrow-traffic-lanes-make-cities-safer-subha-ranjan-banerjee-ben-welle 
[https://perma.cc/7DVS-ZKX5]; Angie Schmitt, Compelling Evidence That Wider Lanes Make City 
Streets More Dangerous, STREETSBLOG USA (May 27, 2015), 
https://usa.streetsblog.org/2015/05/27/compelling-evidence-that-wider-lanes-make-city-streets-
more-dangerous [https://perma.cc/EQK4-FNGF]. 
 62 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 5B.06 (emphasis added). 
 63 A leading urban transportation safety organization even publishes a guide on this subject.  
See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFS., DON’T GIVE UP AT THE  
INTERSECTION (2019), https://nacto.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NACTO_Dont-Give-Up-
at-the-Intersection.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ8T-FNGS]. 
 64 See Bryant Walker Smith, How Reporters Can Evaluate Automated Driving Announcements, 
2020 J.L. & MOBILITY 1, 2. 
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completed in 1921,65 in a broader sense we are now in the 101st year of 
the quest to fully automate driving.  Many cars already have automated 
features, some of them identified by the Manual.66  At this stage, how-
ever, AVs remain an unproven technology.  In 2015, Tesla CEO Elon 
Musk predicted “complete autonomy in approximately two years.”67  Six 
years later, the most successful completely automated vehicle is arguably 
a vacuum cleaner, the Roomba.  As Professor Bryant Walker Smith, a 
leading scholar of the law governing automated vehicles, has written, 
“AVs were 20 years away from the late 1930s until the early 2010s and 
have been about five years away ever since.”68 
At present, several companies operate AVs on public roads on an 
experimental basis.69  These machines are technically constrained in 
where, and under what conditions, they can operate safely.70  They re-
quire extremely expensive equipment, and they rely on machine learning 
and artificial intelligence — technology whose algorithms in other con-
texts have been shown to develop racial biases.71  They also struggle 
with certain real-world conditions, such as construction72 and weather 
hazards.73  Even their potential to reduce crashes by eliminating driver 
error has been estimated to be limited.74 
Recently, some of the deepest skepticism has come from AV execu-
tives themselves.  A senior manager at Volkswagen has warned of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 See Hearst Autos Rsch., What Is an Automatic Car?, CAR & DRIVER, https://www. 
caranddriver.com/research/a31884931/what-is-an-automatic-car [https://perma.cc/CCP3-ET6C]. 
 66 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 5A.02 (including in this category “adaptive cruise control, 
adaptive headlights, automatic emergency braking, lane tracking assist, or other technology based 
features used to control some or all aspects of the vehicle”).  
 67 Fred Lambert, Tesla CEO Elon Musk Drops His Prediction of Full Autonomous Driving from 
3 Years to Just 2, ELECTREK (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:26 PM), https://electrek.co/2015/12/21/tesla-ceo-elon-
musk-drops-prediction-full-autonomous-driving-from-3-years-to-2 [https://perma.cc/JZ74-WWNT]. 
 68 Smith, supra note 64, at 2. 
 69 See, e.g., Kris Holt, Waymo’s Autonomous Vehicles Have Clocked 20 Million Miles on Public 
Roads, ENGADGET (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.engadget.com/waymo-autonomous-vehicles- 
update-san-francisco-193934150.html [https://perma.cc/6M5W-F9XP]. 
 70 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 64, at 12–13; Eric Adams, Why We’re Still Years Away from  
Having Self-Driving Cars, VOX (Sept. 25, 2020, 3:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/ 
recode/2020/9/25/21456421/why-self-driving-cars-autonomous-still-years-away 
[https://perma.cc/7S4N-23QN]. 
 71 See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-bias Intervention, 41 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2020); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 
2221 (2019). 
 72 See, e.g., Waymo Self-Driving Taxi Confused by Traffic Cones Flees Help, BBC NEWS (May 
17, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-57144755 [https://perma.cc/36AG-NZQV]. 
 73 See Will Knight, Snow and Ice Pose a Vexing Obstacle for Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Feb. 
3, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/snow-ice-pose-vexing-obstacle-self-driving-cars 
[https://perma.cc/3562-TN84] (interviewing researchers on the challenges inclement weather poses 
to autonomous vehicles). 
 74 See Self-Driving Vehicles Could Struggle to Eliminate Most Crashes, INS. INST. FOR 
HIGHWAY SAFETY (June 4, 2020), https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/self-driving-vehicles-could-
struggle-to-eliminate-most-crashes [https://perma.cc/5NP9-VL63].  
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astronomical costs of truly effective self-driving cars, observing that “the 
complexity of solving this problem is like a manned mission to Mars”; 
he predicted that full self-driving capability, known as Level 5, “will 
never happen globally.”75  In 2018, the CEO of an AV technology com-
pany expressed similar skepticism about the potential for truly auto-
mated Level 5 cars.76  In 2019, another self-driving car company CEO 
and robotics professor went further, estimating that automated vehicles 
were then “0.01% as good as humans,” and that even if their perfor-
mance doubled every 16 months, parity would not arrive until 2035.77 
The technical limitations of AVs suggest the possibility of destructive 
accommodations.  To help them succeed, AV companies and civic plan-
ners may deem terrible tradeoffs to be necessary — for example, the 
prioritization once again of (typically white) suburban car commuters 
over (frequently nonwhite) urban dwellers.  One auto industry official 
went so far as to advocate this dark possibility in The New York Times, 
suggesting that cities install pedestrian gates on every corner to keep 
people from crossing the street in ways the vehicles’ computers do not 
expect.78 
If AV development were to defy technological expectations and 
achieve viability quickly, it would aggravate rather than ameliorate 
many existing problems of the road system.  Experts predict that, if 
commercialized, AVs would substantially increase vehicle miles trav-
eled, especially in cities — the very places that already suffer from  
elevated levels of pollution and vehicle exposure because of the trans-
portation policy decisions of the past.  It is perhaps unsurprising that 
the National Association of City Transportation Officials has called for 
jettisoning the Proposed Manual’s AV section as well.79 
While the AV industry as a whole has become more measured in its 
predictions, this Chapter would have cities begin to rebuild their streets 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 75 Edward Taylor, VW Says Driverless Vehicles Have Limited Appeal and High Cost, REUTERS 
(Mar. 5, 2019, 12:49 PM), https://reut.rs/2ENwEQW [https://perma.cc/56ZW-WUMP]. 
 76 The Future of Everything, WSJ Tech D.Live: Are We There Yet? The Future of Driverless 
Cars, WALL ST. J., at 03:45 (Nov. 14, 2018, 3:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/wsj-the-future-
of-everything/wsj-tech-dlive-are-we-there-yet-the-future-of-driverless-cars/a0c1b34e-fe21-4c19-
8b98-8e74b0c0643f [https://perma.cc/Y5BV-U9WW] (featuring CEO of Waymo acknowledging 
weather and geography as difficult, sometimes insuperable, constraints, and stating: “I’m not sure 
[the industry is] ever going to achieve an L5 level of automation . . . . It’s important, I think, for all 
of us to be really clear on the language around self-driving”).  
 77 Edwin Olson, The Moore’s Law for Self-Driving Vehicles, MEDIUM (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://medium.com/may-mobility/the-moores-law-for-self-driving-vehicles-b78b8861e184 
[https://perma.cc/MXB7-QA2J] (calculating improvement at rates that double performance every 
16 months). 
 78 Eric A. Taub, How Jaywalking Could Jam Up the Era of Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/business/self-driving-cars-jaywalking.html 
[https://perma.cc/DZP8-FB8N]. 
 79 Modernizing Federal Standards: Making the MUTCD Work for Cities, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CITY TRANSP. OFFS., https://nacto.org/program/modernizing-federal-standards 
[https://perma.cc/AG2E-VX7G]. 
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for AVs anyway.  It would make roads more dangerous to vulnerable 
users solely for the purpose of accommodating a technology that remains 
experimental.  The AV Chapter is both premature and pernicious, and 
should be withdrawn. 
C.  Rewrite the Manual with New Guiding Principles 
After eliminating the 85th Percentile Rule and withdrawing Part 5 
of the Proposed Manual, the FHWA should review the remainder of the 
Manual through the lens of three guiding principles: fostering fairness 
for all types of road users; incorporating diverse expert and community 
opinions; and facilitating local flexibility and innovation, especially in 
cities and communities that are disproportionately harmed by fast ve-
hicular traffic.  Many provisions will remain untouched by a review 
based on these principles.  But where specific provisions hinder achieve-
ment of these provisions, the Manual should be rewritten. 
Fostering equity for all types of road users requires more than treat-
ing all road users with the same priority.  After generations of the  
Manual’s prioritization of vehicle throughput, the next version must en-
sure safety and fairness for nondrivers.  Realizing these values will re-
quire using tools and language that prioritize pedestrians, even if it af-
fects vehicle throughput.  The same priority should be given to 
bicyclists, wheelchair users, and other vulnerable road users to foster a 
safer, more just, and more sustainable vision of the public street. 
When the FHWA reviews the Manual to ensure it is true to these 
goals, many provisions — those that are unlikely to present conflicts 
between vehicles and people using other forms of transportation — will 
be unaffected.  Examples of such provisions include road markings to 
shift lanes on a freeway or highway-rail grade crossing signs on low-
volume roads, both of which are articulated by the Manual.80  But 
where there are clear potential conflicts, including for pedestrian inter-
section crossing signals or bicycle cycle-track signage, priority should be 
for the design solution that is most protective of nondrivers, given their 
vulnerability. 
In practice, assessing priorities and developing new design solutions 
may be hindered by the narrow, engineering-focused perspective of 
Manual drafters and the FHWA.  Certainly, the Manual fashions itself 
as an engineering document; the Proposed Manual’s first section states 
that it “presumes sufficient working knowledge, professional training 
and experience, and education in the principles of engineering.”81  But 
in order to better represent public values and the variety of lawful and 
valuable uses of roads beyond motor vehicle transportation, in seeking 
advice the FHWA should no more confine itself to the input of the traffic 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 2E.24, 6H.01. 
 81 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 1A.01. 
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engineering profession than the Securities and Exchange Commission 
limits itself to investment bankers. 
One way to diversify decisionmaking is to ensure that the composi-
tion of the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(National Committee), which guides the drafting of the Manual, reflects 
more types of road users, not just drivers.82  Currently, National Com-
mittee members must be selected by an eligible sponsoring organiza-
tion.83  Most such organizations specialize in traffic engineering, so the 
narrow perspective of the end product — the Manual — should not be 
surprising.84  Greater diversity could be accomplished by opening up the 
membership nominating process or creating specific positions for key 
stakeholder groups. 
Changes in the National Committee’s composition have the potential 
to generate more well-rounded regulations.  Environmental and public 
health experts, along with people representing the concerns of low-in-
come and minority groups, may bring a more inclusive, broad-minded 
perspective to rulemaking in this area.  Ideally, these changes would 
better reflect a diverse set of values and ideas about who roads are for, 
and how they should be designed.  But good process does not guarantee 
good results.  At a minimum, these changes would help ensure represen-
tation of key stakeholders who are currently frozen out by the National 
Committee process. 
Alternatively or additionally, National Committee drafting discus-
sions could be opened to the public rather than limited to paying mem-
bers meeting behind closed doors.  Doing so could also help with trans-
parent, sound decisionmaking.  Such transparency may be facilitated if 
the official advisory committee is subject to the Federal Advisory  
Committee Act.  While the Manual purports to be an engineering doc-
ument, its impact is far-reaching and affects all Americans.  It codifies 
important policy choices and should serve the interests of all Americans. 
Facilitating local flexibility and innovation, the third guiding princi-
ple we propose in this Essay, may seem to cut against the “U” (for  
“Uniform”) in the Manual’s very name.  Indeed, the Proposed Manual 
states that it aims to “[p]romote national uniformity in the meaning and 
appearance of traffic control devices.”85  For the majority of Manual 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 82 We also note that individual members have sometimes wielded their technical authority for 
narrow ideological purposes.  Illustrating the point, one member of the National Committee recently 
accused Americans participating in the legally mandated Proposed Manual administrative com-
ment process of engaging in “political maneuvering” and “cancel-culture.”  Jessica Wehrman, A 
Traffic Manual “to Fall Asleep by” Stirs Road Rage, ROLL CALL (Apr. 5, 2021, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.rollcall.com/2021/04/05/a-traffic-manual-to-fall-asleep-by-stirs-road-rage 
[https://perma.cc/5FPB-KJLJ]. 
 83 How to Join the National Committee, NAT’L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC CONTROL 
DEVICES, https://ncutcd.org/how-to-join-the-national-committee [https://perma.cc/UD7N-BMKU]. 
 84 See Sponsoring Organizations, NAT’L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES, 
https://ncutcd.org/aboutus/sponsoring-organizations [https://perma.cc/E6A8-FFSW]. 
 85 Proposed Manual, supra note 11, § 1A.01. 
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provisions, uniformity enhances safe and efficient transportation.  It 
gives people, and especially drivers, the comfort of knowing that basic 
rules will not change when they cross invisible jurisdictional boundaries.  
That state and local officials have typically adopted the Manual with 
only very minor adaptations suggests that policymakers see the value in 
uniformity as well.  Many Manual designs are sensible to standardize, 
including stop signs, interstate highway signage, toll road entrance 
markings, and railroad crossing signalization. 
In other cases, total uniformity has suffocated flexibility and innova-
tion.  If deviations from the rules require permission or an engineering 
study, it becomes a more expensive and more time-consuming process 
to innovate.  And if too many practices are prohibited, creativity is ef-
fectively prohibited as well.  For example, with uniformity as the ra-
tionale, the Proposed Manual requires that crosswalks be white.86  Yet 
the reality is that creating variety in crosswalks actually slows drivers, 
which improves safety.87  Moreover, colorful crosswalks can create a 
sense of place and enliven a streetscape.  Yet cities that have tried to 
implement such features are not in compliance with the Manual, and 
may be subject to legal liability for daring to deviate.  The FHWA has 
requested comment on colored crosswalks and how they would “main-
tain the uniformity and recognition of crosswalk markings,” with com-
ments to be supported by “quantifiable and objective data.”88  But if 
these practices have not been allowed, how can empirical studies be car-
ried out to provide quantifiable data?  This is one illustration of how 
focusing on uniformity makes it difficult to explore new practices and 
inhibits the development of more pedestrian-friendly measures. 
Moreover, uniformity primarily inures to the benefit of drivers, as it 
allows them to instantly recognize signs and road markers without hav-
ing to slow down.  When combined with the Manual’s other provisions, 
which seek to maximize vehicular throughput, uniformity has the effect 
of fostering constant streams of fast motor vehicle traffic to the detri-
ment of other road users and community members.  The Manual needs 
to provide guidance that does not merely favor fast driving.  No one 
likes sitting in traffic, but the Manual must also recognize that, in some 
instances, slowing vehicle speeds through road design may be benefi-
cial — and that experimentation by individual communities will be key 
to identifying best practices and fostering local support.  A reworked  
Manual should prioritize flexibility and innovation over uniformity, and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 86 Id. § 3C.03. 
 87 See Emily S. Rueb, The Government Says Rainbow Crosswalks Could Be Unsafe. Are They 
Really?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/crosswalks-ames-iowa-
safety.html [https://perma.cc/QPU7-WAG7]. 
 88 Proposed Revisions to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and  
Highways, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,898, 80,945 (proposed Dec. 14, 2020) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 655). 
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especially in urban and dense suburban locations where there will be 
more potential conflicts between cars and nondrivers, innovation should 
be encouraged.  Communities should be not be forced to choose between 
implementing more modern street designs and complying with the  
Manual.89 
CONCLUSION 
Improving safety for all road users is essential for progress on eco-
nomic prosperity, climate, and racial justice in the United States, yet the 
current Manual undermines those bedrock goals.  The Proposed Manual 
is no better, and, in several ways, it is worse.  It doubles down on the 
mistakes of prior generations of the document, which embody an early-
twentieth-century goal of increasing car ownership and vehicle miles 
traveled.  In addition, it adds an entirely new chapter to accommodate 
a technology, automated vehicles, that remains experimental and prob-
lematic.  The biases enshrined in the Manual undermine safety, equity, 
and economic development, and its continued narrowness reflects a de-
cisionmaking process that has remained closed to diverse input for 
nearly a century. 
We believe fundamental changes to the Manual and Proposed  
Manual are imperative.  A freshly rewritten Manual can advance rules 
of design that minimize rather than amplify the unique dangers to which 
speeding motorists expose vulnerable road users like pedestrians, wheel-
chair users, and bicyclists.  As that process gets underway, we suggest 
that the FHWA also act swiftly to engage its authority under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act to withdraw the 85th Percentile Rule for 
raising speed limits. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 89 Defying the Manual can expose transportation planners to liability and imperil funding.  See, 
e.g., 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(b)(1) (2020) (providing that, where state and federal agency Manuals or 
Manual supplements are required, they “shall be in substantial conformance with the National 
MUTCD”). 
